In Connecticut, however, in a murder case the Court (Loomis, J., and Park, C.J., out of the five Judges dissenting,) held, that standard medical works on insanity might be read to the jury by the counsel for the accused, when |104| discussing the question of his insanity. It was said that “in this jurisdiction (that of Connecticut) for a long series of years counsel have been permitted to read to the jury, as a part of their argument upon this part of their case, extracts from such treatises as by the testimony of experts have been accepted by the profession as authority upon that subject, such treatises as have helped to form the opinion expressed by the expert. The practice by repetition has hardened into a rule” [258]. In Indiana, it was held that if the extracts were merely argumentative and contained no opinions that could be regarded as properly matters of evidence, they might be admitted, subject to the instructions of the Court as to the law of the case and under the warning that they were not evidence. In Texas and in Delaware, similar decisions have been given [259]. And in Ohio, where, at the trial of a cause, counsel was forbidden to read to the jury Youatt’s work on Veterinary Surgery, the Court, on appeal, said, “It is not to be denied, but that a pertinent quotation or extract from a work on science or art, as well as from a classical, historical, or other publication, may, by way of argument or illustration, be not only admissible, but sometimes highly proper, and it would seem to make no difference whether it was repeated by counsel from recollection or read from a book. It would be an abuse of this privilege, however, to make it the pretence of getting improper matter before the jury as evidence in the cause.” As it did not appear that the proposed quotation was relevant or came within the appropriate and legitimate scope of the argument, or that the party was injured by its exclusion, the Court would not reverse on this ground [260]. Where the reading is allowed, it seems to be considered “a valuable privilege, yet so susceptible of abuse, that the |105| extent and manner of its exercise must be entrusted in a great measure to the sound discretion of the Court;”—“not a practice ever sanctioned directly or indirectly by the Court, nor one which has generally been considered by the Judges as of binding force in law, but rather as subject to the discretion which, it is true, has been usually exercised in favor of the accused in capital trials” [261]. Where the exclusion rule obtains, counsel in addressing the jury has no right to quote the opinions of medical men as given in their works; if they do, it is the duty of the Court to instruct the jury that such books are not in evidence but theories simply of medical men [262]. But there is no question that, under all circumstances, books of science may be read in argument to the Court.