The Letters of William James, Vol. 2James, William
Philosophy
The Letters of William James, Vol. 2
James, William
Intellectuals -- United States; James, William, 1842-1910; Philosophers -- United States; Psychologists -- United States
DEAR MILLER,--I got your letter about "Pragmatism," etc., some time ago.
I hear that you are booked to review it for the "Hibbert Journal." Lay
on, Macduff! as hard as you can--I want to have the weak places pointed
out. I sent you a week ago a "Journal of Philosophy"[81] with a word
more about Truth in it, written _at_ you mainly; but I hardly dare hope
that I have cleared up my position. A letter from Strong, two days ago,
written after receiving a proof of that paper, still thinks that I deny
the existence of realities outside of the thinker; and [R. B.] Perry,
who seems to me to have written far and away the most important critical
remarks on Pragmatism (possibly the _only_ important ones), accused
Pragmatists (though he doesn't name _me_) of ignoring or denying that
the real object plays any part in deciding what ideas are true. I
confess that such misunderstandings seem to me hardly credible, and cast
a "lurid light" on the mutual understandings of philosophers generally.
Apparently it all comes from the _word_ Pragmatism--and a most unlucky
word it may prove to have been. I am a natural realist. The world _per
se_ may be likened to a cast of beans on a table. By themselves they
spell nothing. An onlooker may group them as he likes. He may simply
count them all and map them. He may select groups and name these
capriciously, or name them to suit certain extrinsic purposes of his.
Whatever he does, so long as he _takes account_ of them, his account is
neither false nor irrelevant. If neither, why not call it true? It
_fits_ the beans-_minus_-him, and _expresses_ the _total_ fact, of
beans-_plus_-him. Truth in this total sense is partially ambiguous,
then. If he simply counts or maps, he obeys a subjective interest as
much as if he traces figures. Let that stand for pure "intellectual"
treatment of the beans, while grouping them variously stands for
non-intellectual interests. All that Schiller and I contend for is that
there is _no_ "truth" without _some_ interest, and that non-intellectual
interests play a part as well as intellectual ones. Whereupon we are
accused of denying the beans, or denying being in anyway constrained by
them! It's too silly!...
_To Miss Pauline Goldmark._
PUTNAM SHANTY,
KEENE VALLEY, _Sept. 14, 1907_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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