efficient zeal than he manifested throughout the whole of the transactions; and, as I was present when he heard from Lord John of the objection raised by Lord Grey, and was witness to the readiness with which he volunteered to go and bring him to reason, it is impossible to suppose he was playing a double part; but he ought to be made acquainted with these reports, and I am sure he will have no difficulty in effectually disproving them. The reason upon which the embryo Government was broken up will, I am afraid, appear invalid and insufficient to the public; but, for my own part, I cannot regret the result. The undertaking was too vast for the slender means upon which Lord John could rely for success; he could only hope for a doubtful and unhearty support; but, having once embarked in the struggle, he would have been held responsible for all the consequences of failure. After a time, however, I am sure that the country will be glad that the measure should remain in the hands of the only man capable of carrying it, and, deal with it as he may, he must advance Liberal principles, and must break up his party. Ever yours truly, CLARENDON.” These are strong denunciations, strongly expressed; yet, no doubt, Lord Clarendon felt keenly that Lord Aberdeen’s “predilection” for Guizot was “endangering the peaceful relations” between England and France, and his laudation of Lord Palmerston bears equal proof of the sincerity of his impressions. Be it said, with all submission, that we might have gone further with Lord Aberdeen and fared worse. It is perfectly true that the vigour and decision of character so conspicuous in Lord Palmerston was not invariably to be found in Lord Aberdeen. Still, if there was vigour, there was also a certain amount of violence occasionally apparent in the policy of the former. Granting fully that Lord Palmerston might, by a more decided show of opposition than was offered by his predecessor in office, have crushed the _Spanish Marriages_ plot in its inception, and granting all that is said in Lord Clarendon’s letter as to the effect likely to be produced by Lord Aberdeen’s course of action (or inaction) on the “_entente cordiale_” we may be allowed to suspect that, under then existing circumstances, a peril of a different kind, and a more serious, might have arisen from direct interference on the part of the English Government; and that the coldness between the two countries, already caused by the audacity and double-dealing of the King of the French and his minister, might have been exchanged for a more acrid feeling, possibly even subversive of the peace still subsisting between England and France, and involving even the peace of Europe.