Such resolutions as these may be resisted, not only on the ground of the popular rights, but also, and still more efficaciously, in the interest of the monarchical principle, and with reference to ideas of order and stability. Unless we wish to see the now stifled revolution revive, menacing and powerful, it must not be confronted by feeble Governments without root in the soil, destitute of both physical and moral force. If we wish to see thrones respected, we ought not to fill them with despised and despicable princes, whose very names are in irritating antagonism to the sentiment—the national sentiment—now dominating in Italy. If the Grand Duke or his son return to Florence, then, in less than a month, Tuscany will be the head quarters of Mazzini and of the belligerent revolution. Perhaps it will be said that the Duchess or Parma is a strong-minded woman, and is not unappreciated. However this may be, the so hateful remembrances of the father could not be effaced, nor could confidence be inspired in the son. Besides, the system of compensations which some would wish to apply in favour of this branch of the Bourbon family is in direct collision with the sentiments and the ideas which now prevail in Europe. The Modenese would be smitten in their dignity if they found themselves allotted by way of jointure to the widow of that rascal, the petty Duke of Parma. Better for them the restoration of their former Sovereign. In that case they would be victims of a false principle; but they would not be treated as a flock of sheep, disposed of as a counterbalance for conditions deemed onerous by one of the contracting parties. The Treaty of Vienna is odious enough in many parts; but it is not so odious as that of Campoformio.