The successful commander, in transmitting by Captain Glegg his dispatches to the governor-general at Montreal, expressed, through his aide-de-camp, his intention of proceeding immediately to Kingston, and from thence to the attack of the naval arsenal at Sackett's Harbour, on Lake Ontario. Had its destruction been accomplished--and no one can doubt that this was the proper period to attempt it, as the enemy, dispirited by the capture of Detroit, would probably have offered but a feeble resistance--the Americans could not, without much additional difficulty and future risk of destruction, have built and equipped the fleet which subsequently gave them the naval ascendancy on that lake, and enabled them twice in 1813 to capture the capital of Upper Canada. The armistice, however, caused a delay of nearly a fortnight in the necessary preparations, as Major-General Brock returned from Detroit to Fort George on the 24th of August, and the cessation of the truce was not known to him until his arrival at Kingston, on the 4th of September. The distance by water between Fort George and Kingston is about 160 miles, and from Kingston to Sackett's Harbour only 35 miles; so that the destruction of the arsenal might have been effected early in September, had not the armistice prevented the attempt. But, unhappily for the interests of his country and the credit of his own fame, Sir George Prevost disapproved of the proposition, and commanded Major-General Brock to relinquish all idea of the contemplated enterprize, although the official intelligence of the president's refusal to continue the suspension of hostilities reached him at Montreal on the 30th of August, a day or two _before_ Captain Glegg, with the dispatches and trophies of the capture of Detroit. At the commencement of the war, a defensive attitude was perhaps excusable, especially as the British cabinet seems to have been anxious to accommodate the differences between the two countries; but _after_ the American government had refused to continue the armistice, it appears to us that Sir George Prevost was pursuing a suicidal course, as to wait for the enemy till he shall have prepared his forces and passed your frontiers, to plunder your towns and occupy your country, is a very recent expedient recognized by no government, and practised by no people of ancient or modern times. But notwithstanding the delay caused by the armistice, the proposed attack could still have been carried into effect after its cessation; and it was only relinquished by express orders from the commander-in-chief. We seek not to impugn his motives, as they probably originated in a mistaken sense of duty, and evidently from an impression that to attack the Americans again on their own frontier would be to render the contest more popular among them. It was under this impression that, in a general order[88] issued at Montreal on the 31st of August, the commander-in-chief was weak enough to offer an indirect apology to the