In my last dispatch from Lord Bathurst, dated the 4th of July, he tells me, "that his majesty's government trusts I will be enabled to suspend with perfect safety all extraordinary preparations for defence which I may have been induced to make in consequence of the precarious state of the relations between this country and the United States; and that as every specific requisition for warlike stores and accoutrements which had been received from me had been complied with, with the exception of the clothing of the corps proposed to be raised from the Glengary emigrants, he had not thought it necessary to direct the preparation of any further supplies." This will afford you a strong proof of the infatuation of his majesty's ministers upon the subject of American affairs, and shew how entirely I have been left to my own resources in the event which has taken place. Judging from what you have already effected in Upper Canada, I do not doubt but that, with your present means of defence, you will be able to maintain your position at Fort George, and that the enemy will be again foiled in any further attempts they may make to invade the province. I leave to your discretion to decide on the necessity of sending a reinforcement to Michilimakinack. _Major-General Brock to Colonel Proctor_. FORT GEORGE, September 17, 1812. I have had before me your several communications to the 11th instant, addressed to myself and to Major-General Sheaffe. I approve of your having detached a party to aid in the reduction of Fort Wayne, not only because its destruction will render your position more secure, but also from the probable result of saving the garrison from sharing the fate of that of Chicago; but it must be explicitly understood, that you are not to resort to offensive warfare for purposes of conquest. Your operations are to be confined to measures of defence and security. With this view, if you should have credible information of the assembling of bodies of troops to march against you, it may become necessary to destroy the fort at Sandusky, and the road which runs through it from Cleveland to the foot of the rapids: the road from the river Raisin to Detroit is perhaps in too bad a state to offer any aid to the approach of an enemy, except in the winter; and if a winter campaign should be contemplated against you, it is probable that magazines would be formed in Cleveland and its vicinity, of all which you will of course inform yourself. In carrying on our operations in your quarter, it is of primary importance that the confidence and good-will of the Indians should be preserved, and that whatsoever can tend to produce a contrary effect should be most carefully avoided. I therefore most strongly urge and enjoin your acting on those principles on