“Now, --as conscience is nothing else but the knowledge which the mind has within herself of this; and the judgment, either of approbation or censure, which it unavoidably makes upon the successive actions of our lives; ’tis plain you will say, from the very terms of the proposition, --whenever this inward testimony goes against a man, and he stands self-accused, that he must necessarily be a guilty man. --And, on the contrary, when the report is favourable on his side, and his heart condemns him not: --that it is not a matter of _trust_, as the apostle intimates, but a matter of _certainty_ and fact, that the conscience is good, and that the man must be good also.” [Then the apostle is altogether in the wrong, I suppose, quoth Dr. _Slop_, and the Protestant divine is in the right. Sir, have patience, replied my father, for I think it will presently appear that St. _Paul_ and the Protestant divine are both of an opinion. --As nearly so, quoth Dr. _Slop_, as east is to west; --but this, continued he, lifting both hands, comes from the liberty of the press. It is no more, at the worst, replied my uncle _Toby_, than the liberty of the pulpit; for it does not appear that the sermon is printed, or ever likely to be. Go on, _Trim_, quoth my father.] “At first sight this may seem to be a true state of the case: and I make no doubt but the knowledge of right and wrong is so truly impressed upon the mind of man, --that did no such thing ever happen, as that the conscience of a man, by long habits of sin, might (as the scripture assures it may) insensibly become hard; --and, like some tender parts of his body, by much stress and continual hard usage, lose by degrees that nice sense and perception with which God and nature endowed it: --Did this never happen; --or was it certain that self-love could never hang the least bias upon the judgment; --or that the little interests below could rise up and perplex the faculties of our upper regions, and encompass them about with clouds and thick darkness: ----Could no such thing as favour and affection enter this sacred Court: --Did WIT disdain to take a bribe in it; --or was ashamed to shew its face as an advocate for an unwarrantable enjoyment: Or, lastly, were we assured that INTEREST stood always unconcerned whilst the cause was hearing--and that Passion never got into the judgment-seat, and pronounced sentence in the stead of Reason, which is supposed always to preside and determine upon the case: --Was this truly so, as the objection must suppose; --no doubt then the religious and moral state of a man would be exactly what he himself esteemed it: --and the guilt or innocence of every man’s life could be known, in general, by no better measure, than the degrees of his own approbation and censure.