Between the Election and the assembling of Parliament the Government was greatly disturbed by the renewed outbreak of outrages in Ireland, and of the commercial panic which had long been imminent. These two events caused Ministers to summon Parliament on the 18th of November. The panic in spring, which we traced to dearth and high prices of food-stuffs, was eased in Midsummer by the fall in prices. This, however, in its turn, produced the second panic in the autumn, for speculators had bought corn in advance at rates far above those which began to rule the market. Then money became “tight.” On the 5th of August the Bank raised the rate of discount to 5½ per cent., and Funds fell 2 per cent. in a week--from 88⅝ to 86¾. At the end of August failures to the extent of £3,000,000 were announced, and on the 1st of October the Bank of England refused to make any further advances on Stock. At the end of the week consols fell to 80½. On the 19th of October they were sold for money at 78, and for the account at 79, and Exchequer bills fell as low as 30 per cent. discount. Banking-houses of national importance now began to close their doors, and confidence vanished from the commercial world. On the 25th of October the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer, in response to piteous appeals from merchants and bankers all over the country, recommended the directors of the Bank of England “to enlarge the amount of their discounts and advances upon approved security,” but that the rate of interest should be 8 per cent., so as “to retain this operation within reasonable limits.” They were promised an indemnity if this course led them to infringe the restrictions of the Bank Act. As the offer of advances at 8 per cent. was not tempting, the Bank never required to break the law, which established a fixed ratio between their gold and their securities, but the announcement that the Bank Act was virtually suspended, restored confidence by restoring hope. Lord Campbell seems to indicate in his Autobiography that Ministers themselves were frightened, “there being an apprehension that the dividends may not be paid, and that the Bank of England may stop, and that there may be a pecuniary crash, public and private.” All through this crisis Sir Robert Peel’s Bank Act was virulently attacked as being one of the causes of the distress. He himself behaved with signal generosity. He recognised the necessity for giving way to popular prejudices at a time of panic, and when the Queen informed him at Windsor that Lord John Russell had decided virtually to suspend the Act, he observed that the step was [Illustration: LORD PALMERSTON.]