The Life and Times of Queen Victoria; vol. 2 of 4Wilson, Robert
History
The Life and Times of Queen Victoria; vol. 2 of 4
Wilson, Robert
Great Britain -- History -- Victoria, 1837-1901; Victoria, Queen of Great Britain, 1819-1901
The shock of Raglan’s death silenced at the time all just criticism on
his career. The most that can be said for him is said by Lord Malmesbury
in his “Memoirs of an Ex-Minister.” “I knew him well,” he writes, “and
cannot recollect a finer character. He was the Duke’s right-hand man
through the Peninsular war, and was greatly esteemed by him. Handsome
and high-bred in person, and charming in society, he was one of the most
popular of its members. He was remarkable for his coolness under fire,
and St. Arnaud, in his famous despatch after the battle of the Alma,
says of him: ‘Il avait toujours ce même calme qui ne le quitte jamais.’”
It is, alas! not given to every man to wield the Arthurian brand
Excalibur, and whatever he may have been in the Peninsula under
Wellington, in the Crimea, Raglan was almost as incompetent as St.
Arnaud, Canrobert, and Menschikoff. His blunders were as follows: (1),
According to Sir T. Martin, he approved of the invasion of the Crimea in
utter ignorance of the ground, when the campaign was proposed by the
French Emperor.[219] (2), He consented to invade the Crimea _after_ he
had discovered that it was a mad project, and when the discretionary
clause in his instructions from the Duke of Newcastle gave him an
opportunity of remonstrating with the Cabinet. (3), He invaded the
Crimea without an organised Transport Corps. (4), His blunders at the
Alma, Balaclava, and Inkermann have been already noted. (5), Till
pressure was put on him by Prince Albert, he concealed the miserable
state of the army from the Government. (6), By neglecting to make a road
between Balaclava and his camp he brought all the miseries of the winter
of ’54-’55 on his troops. (7), By attacking the Redan when he knew quite
well it was impossible to capture it, he doomed his troops to useless
and avoidable slaughter. No defence has been made for him except on the
last two counts of the heavy indictment against him. He did not make a
road from Balaclava to the camp, says Mr. Kinglake, because he had not
enough men at his disposal. This is an explanation rather than a
defence. His first duty as a general was to connect his camp with his
base. If he was unable to do that, he ought to have abandoned his
position. But is not Mr. Kinglake’s defence just a little absurd, taken
in connection with the Homeric episodes of the war? Had anybody enough
men to do anything great or valuable in the Crimea? Campbell had not
enough men to turn the tide of battle, in our favour at the Alma. But he
did it. He had not enough men to save our base at Balaclava--but he
saved it. Scarlett and Cardigan had not enough men to break through the
Russian columns in “the Valley of Death”--but they broke through them.
The Duke of Cambridge had not enough men to hold his ground at
Inkermann--but he and his Guards held it, till it was positively soaked
and saturated with their blood. Mr. Kinglake’s advocacy, indeed,
provokes one to say that scarcity of men never kept Lord Raglan back
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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