Stewart’s losses, especially in camels, were so heavy that his first idea was to halt at Abu Klea for reinforcements. But he decided to push on, even at the risk of leaving his wounded behind him. The wells of Abu Klea were occupied, and it was then ascertained that the 10,000 Arabs who had been defeated, were but the advanced guard of a great army near Metamneh. Papers were discovered, among which was a letter from the Emir of Berber to the Mahdi, showing that Stewart’s occupation of Gakdul had caused the concentration of the Arabs in force at Abu Klea. The expedition was thus at the outset marred by a fatal blunder in generalship. If Stewart had gone straight across the Bayuda Desert, without wasting time at Gakdul, he would have had no enemy barring his path to Metamneh. By letting the Mahdi’s troops concentrate at Abu Klea, he met with the check that delayed his progress till it was too late to save Khartoum.[221] On the 18th of January Stewart made a forced night march towards the Nile, which he hoped to strike three miles above Metamneh. His column got into terrible disorder in the dark, for men and cattle were utterly exhausted from hunger and want of sleep. At 7 a.m. it came within sight of Metamneh--men and horses and camels being scarcely able to walk. It was resolved to rest for breakfast before attacking the town, but the Arabs closed round Stewart’s zareba, and poured in a dropping fire, which did serious execution. At 10.15 a.m. Stewart himself was shot, and the command was assumed by Sir Charles Wilson, Chief of the Intelligence Department, who happened to be the senior colonel on the field. Sir Charles Wilson, though an officer in the Royal Engineers, was really a scholar and diplomatist who had spent most of his life in civil employment. Still, he did not shrink from the task which an unforeseen accident imposed on him. He undertook the strategic direction of the column, but prudently handed over the tactical control to Colonel Boscawen of the Guards. Having fortified the zareba, Wilson quickly formed his main body into a square, and determined to make a dash for the Nile. Had he not ventured on this perilous step, the whole column must have perished from thirst. Every inch of the way had to be contested, but happily Wilson’s frigid temperament seemed to have in some degree communicated itself to his men. Hence, the same troops who at Abu Klea under Stewart’s showy but exciting leadership got out of hand and fired wildly, were soon calm and steady, and held in complete check by their officers. They had not proceeded far when swarms of Arabs, as at Abu Klea, charged down upon the square from a ridge at a place known as Abu Kru. At first Wilson’s troops began to fire at random as at Abu Klea, and no shot told. Then he ordered the bugles to sound “Cease firing,” and the officers coolly kept the men at rest for five minutes, which steadied their nerves. By this time