Historians are unanimous in their opinion that the Tullahoma campaign was one of the most masterly exhibitions of strategic genius possible to the commander of a great army. Mahan, author of the _Critical History of the Civil War_, who is ever ready to attack and expose the blunders of the Union generals, declares that this Tullahoma campaign shows “_as skillful combinations as the history of war presents_.” But the Tullahoma campaign was not the conclusion of the advance which General Garfield had so persistently urged, and the success of which had been so triumphantly demonstrated. An important line of defense had been broken through; an enormous piece of territory had been captured. But Bragg still held Chattanooga, which was the objective point of the Army of the Cumberland. In his argument of June 12, to induce an advance, Garfield had said: “While it would lengthen our communications, it would give us possession of McMinnville, and _enable us to threaten Chattanooga_ and East Tennessee; _and it would not be unreasonable to expect an early occupation of the former place_.” It is yet to be seen what fulfillment there was of this prophecy. After the Tullahoma victory, and Bragg’s retreat behind the Tennessee River, Rosecrans stopped. Again, the War Department ordered an advance. Again, the commander-in-chief refused. Again, Garfield urged that no delay take place. Rosecrans was immovable. The Department waited; the army waited; the country waited. At last the following dispatch was received: “WASHINGTON, August 5, 1863. “The orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be reported daily, are peremptory. H. W. HALLECK.”