"We, a goodly company, thus place ourselves in direct opposition with immaterial animisers. We regret the term 'psychic force' applied to zoo-electricity, because it asserts a soul-theory. We claim to know the genesis of the soul, the place and almost the date of its birth. The beautiful conception of a refined body-form, denoted by the golden heart of the mummy, was familiar to the ancient Egyptian who, as Mr. Bonwick lately told you, had a soul's soul, as well as a body's soul. And, note, that your modern belief in perispirits and spirit-forms is that of the heathenry on the banks of the Nile who disbelieved in Moses. The Hebrews, Moses included, agreed to banish from their system a Soul-land, a Spirit-land, a Ghost-land, a Kutome, or Dead-man's-land, as Dáhome calls it; in other words, a future world, a state of rewards and punishments. Contented with _Ruach_ (Arabic Ruh), the 'breath,' that is, the sign and symbol of life, these sturdy materialists wanted no Gentile '_Atma_' (soul) in addition to '_Mátrá_' (matter). In Asia the fair vision may be traced to the Guebres, who taught it to the Jews during the captivity at Babylon: their subsequent teaching, Manicheism, or Dulism, the antagonism of light and darkness, good and bad, god and devil, positive and negative electricity is, still, and long will be, a power in the world of faith. In Europe it arose amongst the fair humanities of pagan Greece and Rome; as Cupid and Psyche prove, it did noble service to the poets; while prosaic Pliny declared that 'to seek for other beings external to him, is not only useless to man, but beyond his power.' St. Paul introduced into Christendom the threefold idea of a natural body, which could become a glorified body, of a soul, and of a spirit; while the moderns remark, 'Our ideas of the soul are not what they were a century ago; a century hence they will not be what they are now.' Personally, I ignore the existence of soul and spirit, feeling no want of a self within a self, an I within an I. If it be a question of words, and my _ego_, or subject, as opposed to the _non-ego_, or object; or my individuality, the concourse of conditions which differentiates me from others, be called a soul, then I have a soul, but not a soul proper. For some years, however, I have managed to live without what is popularly called a soul; and it would be hard to find one violently thrust into the recusant body.