Our final extract shall exhibit a sample of Galileo's metaphysics, in which may be observed the germ of a theory very closely allied to that which was afterwards developed by Locke and Berkeley.—"I have now only to fulfil my promise of declaring my opinions on the proposition that motion is the cause of heat, and to explain in what manner it appears to me that it may be true. But I must first make some remarks on that which we call heat, since I strongly suspect that a notion of it prevails which is very remote from the truth; for it is believed that there is a true accident, affection, and quality, really inherent in the substance by which we feel ourselves heated. This much I have to say, that so soon as I conceive a material or corporeal substance, I simultaneously feel the necessity of conceiving that it has its boundaries, and is of some shape or other; that, relatively to others, it is great or small; that it is in this or that place, in this or that time; that it is in motion, or at rest; that it touches, or does not touch another body; that it is unique, rare, or common; nor can I, by any act of the imagination, disjoin it from these qualities: but I do not find myself absolutely compelled to apprehend it as necessarily accompanied by such conditions, as that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, sonorous or silent, smelling sweetly or disagreeably; and if the senses had not pointed out these qualities, it is probable that language and imagination alone could never have arrived at them. Because, I am inclined to think that these tastes, smells, colours, &c., with regard to the subject in which they appear to reside, are nothing more than mere names, and exist only in the sensitive body; insomuch that, when the living creature is removed, all these qualities are carried off and annihilated; although we have imposed particular names upon them, and different from those of the other first and real accidents, and would fain persuade ourselves that they are truly and in fact distinct. But I do not believe that there exists any thing in external bodies for exciting tastes, smells, and sounds, but size, shape, quantity, and motion, swift or slow; and if ears, tongues, and noses were removed, I am of opinion that shape, number, and motion would remain, but there would be an end of smells, tastes, and sounds, which, abstractedly from the living creature, I take to be mere words."