But Kepler fancied that he saw many sound reasons why this could not be the true law of motion in the epicycle, on which reasons he relied much more firmly than on the indisputable fact, which he mentions as a collateral proof, that it was contradicted by the observations. Some of these reasons are subjoined: "In the beginning of the work it has been declared to be most absurd, that a planet (even though we suppose it endowed with mind) should form any notion of a centre, and a distance from it, if there be no body in that centre to serve for a distinguishing mark. And although you should say, that the planet has respect to the sun, and knows beforehand, and remembers the order in which the distances from the sun are comprised, so as to make a perfect excentric; in the first place, this is rather far-fetched, and requires, in any mind, means for connecting the effect of an accurately circular path with the sign of an increasing and diminishing diameter of the sun. But there are no such means, except the position of the centre of the excentric at a given distance from the sun; and I have already said, that this is beyond the power of a mere mind. I do not deny that a centre may be imagined, and a circle round it; but this I do say, if the circle exists only in imagination, with no external sign or division, that it is not possible that the path of a moveable body should be really ordered round it in an exact circle. Besides, if the planet chooses from memory its just distances from the sun, so as exactly to form a circle, it must also take from the same source, as if out of the Prussian or Alphonsine tables, equal excentric arcs, to be described in unequal times, and to be described by a force extraneous from the sun; and thus would have, from its memory, a foreknowledge of what effects a virtue, senseless and extraneous from the sun, was about to produce: all these consequences are absurd.