The Austrian army, with its imposing numbers, high military reputation, and menacing attitude a few weeks before, when threatening and afterward invading Piedmont, from the line of the Mincio, had now become vastly weakened, reduced, and disheartened by the successive conflicts and defeats which have been briefly described. The causes of its misfortunes have been accounted for, by an eye-witness, in remarks which we abridge as follows: "The Austrian military system has been changed completely within the last six or seven years; yet the change in part explains the shortcomings of the past few weeks. The Austrian army, up to this date, has been an army of very young soldiers, not long under training. According to the regulations, a fixed number of corps has to be maintained throughout the Austrian empire. At a fixed period of every year the youth of that empire are drafted into the army, and distributed among the corps. The arrival of these new drafts liberates an equal number of men who have already served. The latter, after one, or two, or three years' service, at the option of the colonels of regiments, retire to their homes on a furlough of indefinite duration, and are only called out again in the event of a war. The Austrian army at Montebello, Palestro, Magenta, and Cavriana was thus composed of young soldiers. It would have been wiser, doubtless, had the Austrians thought of this matter in time. They were aware that Louis Napoleon would move, if he moved at all, with the flower of his army. They knew that he had paid high premiums to induce old soldiers to remain in the ranks after the expiration of their usual time, and that the picked men of the French army, tried under the fierce sun of Africa, and in the hard campaign of the Crimea, would be opposed to them, and be assisted besides by an artillery of a novel and most effective kind. They did not take sufficient heed of these important facts, any more than they considered that generals who, ten years ago, fought with ability and success in the campaigns of Italy might possibly have lost some of their original vigor. The result has been such as to open their eyes to the necessity of supplying defects. The question, as far as the present war is concerned, is this: Which is best, to risk all the tried men first, and trust to recruits after, or employ first the young soldiers, and bring up reserves after? As far as the present campaign is concerned, the results favor the first of these alternatives.