treaty itself, or a fair and just compensation obtained for the non-performance of those stipulations which the United States had failed to observe. Though urged by Mr. Morris to state explicitly in what respects, and to what degree, he considered the final completion of those engagements to which the United States were bound, as having been rendered impracticable, no such statement was given; and the British government seemed inclined to avoid, for the present, those full and satisfactory explanations, which were sought on the part of the United States. After detailing the motives which in his opinion influenced the English cabinet in wishing to suspend for a time all discussions with America, Mr. Morris observed, "perhaps there never was a moment in which this country felt herself greater; and consequently, it is the most unfavourable moment to obtain advantageous terms from her in any bargain." Whilst these negotiations were pending, intelligence was received at London of the attack made on the British settlement at Nootka Sound; and preparations were instantly made to resent the insult alleged to have been offered to the nation. The high ground taken on this occasion by the government, and the vigour with which it armed in support of its pretensions, furnished strong reasons for the opinion that a war with Spain, and probably with France, would soon be commenced. In America, this was considered as a favourable juncture for urging the claims of the United States to the free navigation of the Mississippi. Mr. Carmichael, their charge d'affaires at the court of Madrid, was instructed not only to press this point with earnestness, but to use his utmost endeavours to secure the unmolested use of that river in future, by obtaining a cession of the island of New Orleans, and of the Floridas. A full equivalent for this cession would be found, it was said, in the sincere friendship of the United States, and in the security it would give to the territories of Spain, west of the Mississippi. Mr. Carmichael was also instructed to point the attention of the Spanish government to the peculiar situation of the United States. To one half of their territory, the use of the Mississippi was indispensable. No efforts could prevent their acquiring it. That they would acquire it, either by acting separately, or in conjunction with Great Britain, was one of those inevitable events against which human wisdom could make no provision. To the serious consideration of the Spanish government, therefore, were submitted the consequences which must result to their whole empire in America, either from hostilities with the United States, or from a seizure of Louisiana by Great Britain.