The answers of the two houses noticed, briefly and generally, the various topics of the speech; and, though perhaps less warm than those of the preceding congress, manifested great respect for the executive magistrate, and an undiminished confidence in his patriotic exertions to promote the public interests. [Sidenote: Debate on the bill "for apportioning representatives among the people of the states according to the first enumeration."] Among the first subjects of importance which engaged the attention of the legislature, was a bill "for apportioning representatives among the people of the several states according to the first enumeration." The constitution, in its original form, had affixed no other limits to the power of congress over the numbers of which the house of representatives might consist, than that there should not be more than one member for every thirty thousand persons; but that each state should be entitled to at least one. Independent of the general considerations in favour of a more or less numerous representation in the popular branch of the legislature, there was one of a local nature, whose operation, though secret, was extensive, which gave to this question a peculiar interest. To whatever number of persons a representative might be allotted, there would still remain a fraction, which would be greater or less in each state, according to the ratio which congress should adopt between representation and population. The relative power of states, in one branch of the legislature, would consequently be affected by this ratio; and to questions of that description, few members can permit themselves to be inattentive. This bill, as originally introduced into the house of representatives, gave to each state one member for every thirty thousand persons. On a motion to strike out the number thirty thousand, the debate turned chiefly on the policy and advantage of a more or less numerous house of representatives; but with the general arguments suggested by the subject, strong and pointed allusions to the measures of the preceding congress were interspersed, which indicated much more serious hostility to the administration than had hitherto been expressed. Speaking of the corruption which he supposed to exist in the British house of commons, Mr. Giles said that causes essentially different from their numbers, had produced this effect. "Among these, were the frequent mortgages of the funds, and the immense appropriations at the disposal of the executive."