To those motives which a doubtful contest for power, and for victory, can not fail to furnish, were added others of vast influence on the human mind. Those who supported the resolution, declaring the expediency of carrying the treaty into effect, firmly believed that the faith of the nation was pledged, and that its honour, its character, and its constitution, depended on the vote about to be given. They also believed that the best interests of the United States required an observance of the compact as formed. In itself, it was thought as favourable as the situation of the contracting parties, and of the world, entitled them to expect; but its chief merit consisted in the adjustment of ancient differences, and in its tendency to produce future amicable dispositions, and friendly intercourse. If congress should refuse to perform this treaty on the part of the United States, a compliance on the part of Great Britain could not be expected. The posts on the great lakes would still be occupied by their garrisons; no compensation would be made for American vessels illegally captured; the hostile dispositions which had been excited would be restored with increased aggravation; and that these dispositions must lead infallibly to war, was implicitly believed. They also believed that the political subjugation of their country would be the inevitable consequence of a war with Britain, during the existing impassioned devotion of the United States to France. The opposite party was undoubtedly of opinion that the treaty contained stipulations really injurious to the United States. Several favourite principles to which they attached much importance, were relinquished by it; and some of the articles relative to commerce, were believed to be unequal in their operation. Nor ought the sincerity with which their opinion on the constitutional powers of the house had been advanced, to be questioned. In the fervour of political discussion, that construction which, without incurring the imputation of violating the national faith, would enable the popular branch of the legislature to control the President and senate in making treaties, may have been thought the safe and the correct construction. But no consideration appears to have had more influence than the apprehension that the amicable arrangements made with Great Britain, would seriously affect the future relations of the United States with France. Might a conjecture on this subject be hazarded, it would be that, in the opinion of many intelligent men, the preservation of that honest and real neutrality between the belligerent powers, at which the executive had aimed, was impracticable; that America would probably be forced into the war; and that the possibility of a rupture with France was a calamity too tremendous not to be avoided at every hazard.