On the first substitute, it was said that the late communications must satisfy every person who had attended to them, that all hope of purchasing a peace must be abandoned, unless there was a manifestation of some force which might give effect to negotiation. So long as the vessels of the United States remained an easy and tempting prey to the cupidity of those corsairs, it would be vain to expect that they would sell a peace for the price the government would be willing to give, or that a peace would be of any duration. If the executive had experienced such difficulties while the Algerine cruisers had captured only one or two vessels, and were confined to the Mediterranean by a Portuguese squadron, how much less prospect was there of success after they had captured a considerable number of ships, were likely to capture many more, and were at liberty to cruise on the Atlantic to the very coasts of the United States? Even that little prospect of success would be diminished, when the dey of Algiers should understand that the United States would take no measures to protect their trade, and were afraid of the expense of a small armament. It was to be understood that they did not rely solely on the operations of the armament. They still looked forward to negotiation, and were willing to provide the means for purchasing a peace. But the former measure was necessary to give success to the latter, and the armament might be employed to advantage should negotiation fail. The other substitute was to subsidize foreign powers. The national dishonour of depending upon others for that protection which the United States were able to afford themselves, was strongly urged. But there were additional objections to this project. Either the nations in contemplation were at peace or at war with the regency of Algiers. If the former, it was not to be expected that they would relinquish that peace for any indemnification the United States could make them. If the latter, they had sufficient inducements to check the depredations of their enemies without subsidies. Such a protection would be hazardous, as it would be, at any time, in the power of the nation that should be employed, to conclude a truce with Algiers, and leave the trade of the United States at the mercy of her corsairs. While the expense of protection was perpetually to be incurred, it would never furnish the strength which that expense ought to give. With a navy of her own, America might co-operate to advantage with any power at war with Algiers, but it would be risking too much to depend altogether on any foreign nation.