This dangling of a possible prize before him was carried to the convention on the day it met and was never permitted out of his range of vision up to the very day that Woodrow Wilson was nominated. Mr. Bryan tells me that one of the reasons given him by Kern for his opposition to being nominated for the temporary chairmanship was the fact that “he was embarrassed by the fact that he was being mentioned for the presidency by men in other delegations” and such prominence as might follow his nomination for the chairmanship might be falsely interpreted as a bid for the prize. On the second day of the convention the Associated Press carried the story that many astute politicians had reached the conclusion that under the two-thirds rule of Democratic conventions none of the avowed candidates could be nominated and that “some of the progressives” had commenced to “test sentiment for Kern” and that the movement had “gained considerable momentum.” On that day it was a commonplace comment about the hotel lobbies that the nominee “would be Wilson or Kern.” And on that day men of much political importance in other states than Indiana began to interest themselves in “testing sentiment for Kern.” The theory of these men was that when the “conservatives” found they could not nominate Clark or Harmon, and the “progressives” learned they could not nominate Wilson, both elements would find in Kern the satisfactory way out. And during that time Kern was importuned, and harassed, every hour of the day, dragged from the Resolutions committee to meet delegates anxious to vote for him, followed to his room at night. When the movement reached such proportions as to seem serious he took the position that as long as there was any possibility of the nomination of any of the avowed candidates, and as long as there was any chance of a compromise on Marshall his name should not under any circumstances appear in the balloting.