“It is not despotism which, by my banishment, has reacted against the constitutional _régime_. That is not at all the case. Montesquieu has taught us that the creation of a constitution is very difficult and takes much time. A sovereign prince, accustomed to absolute power, can only be persuaded little by little to abandon his prerogatives, that being necessary to the constitutional _régime_. It is a difficult task, frequently interrupted by contrary currents, but for all that one need never despair of reaching the goal, for with time, patience and perseverance success is attainable. It is not in the person of the Sultan, nor yet through his present Ministers, that I see danger for the Constitution, but rather in the want of character and of courage so often to be found in those who are the Sovereign’s Councillors, and who, instead of acting according to their convictions, seek their own advantage in hiding the truth. I have never hesitated about giving my opinion to the Sultan, whoever he might be, whenever it happened to differ from his; I have always done so with the greatest respect, but also without the least reticence. Many a misfortune might have been avoided in this world of ours if there had not been a great lack of men, capable of placing the whole truth before their Sovereign. “The danger to the Constitution lies, not in the lack of goodwill, but in the ignorance as to how to manage the mechanism. The Governmental form of despotism reminds me somewhat of a primitive mill, which may be turned by the force of water, or may equally be turned by its wheel. Constitutional Government also resembles a mill—but one that is put in movement by a complicated and artistically constructed mechanism. A knowledge as to how to work this machine and to keep it in movement is absolutely necessary. Thus, we must hope that the men of experience who find themselves at the head of affairs at Constantinople will not put the machinery of the new mill in motion, in accordance with the ideas and routine of the primitive mill. Constitutional Government cannot have the customs and the men of the Despotic system as its motive power. Reshid Pasha, our great reformer, was one day reproached for employing young men who had only just left college; he replied that it was right that it should be so, as neither one man alone, nor yet ten, could possibly do everything, and that it was therefore necessary to prepare a fresh staff of administrators. This has always been my idea, and whenever I have seen many rivals around me, I have delighted in the thought that it was to the profit of my country.