The Life of Napoleon I (Volume 2 of 2)Rose, J. Holland (John Holland)
History
The Life of Napoleon I (Volume 2 of 2)
Rose, J. Holland (John Holland)
France -- History -- 1789-1815; France -- Kings and rulers -- Biography; Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821
"An army of 50,000 men, Russians, French, and perhaps a few
Austrians, that penetrated by way of Constantinople into Asia,
would not reach the Euphrates before England would tremble and bow
the knee before the Continent. I am ready in Dalmatia. Your
Majesty is ready on the Danube. A month after we came to an
agreement the army could be on the Bosphorus.... By the 1st of May
our troops can be in Asia, and at the same time those of Your
Majesty, at Stockholm. Then the English, threatened in the Indies,
and chased from the Levant, will be crushed under the weight of
events with which the atmosphere will be charged."[196]
There were several reasons why Napoleon should urge on this scheme. He
was irritated by the continued resistance of Great Britain, and
thought to terrify us into surrender by means of those oriental
enterprises which convinced our statesmen that we must fight on for
dear life. He also desired to restore the harmony of his relations
with Alexander. For, in truth, the rapturous harmonies of Tilsit had
soon been marred by discord. Alexander did not withdraw his troops
from the Danubian provinces; whereupon Napoleon declined to evacuate
Silesia; and the friction resulting from this wary balancing of
interests was increased, when, at the close of 1807, a formal proposal
was sent from Paris that, if Russia retained those provinces, Silesia
should be at the disposal of France.[197] The dazzling vistas opened
up to Alexander's gaze at Tilsit were thus shrouded by a sordid and
distasteful bargain, which he hotly repelled. To repair this false
step, Napoleon now wrote the alluring letter quoted above; and the
Czar exclaimed on perusing it: "Ah, this is the language of Tilsit."
Yet, it may be questioned whether Napoleon desired to press on an
immediate partition of the Ottoman Power. His letter invited the Czar
to two great enterprises, the conquest of Finland and the invasion of
Persia and India. The former by itself was destined to tax Russia's
strength. Despite Alexander's offer of a perpetual guarantee for the
Finnish constitution and customs, that interesting people opposed a
stubborn resistance. Napoleon must also have known that Russia's
forces were then wholly unequal to the invasion of India; and his
invitation to Alexander to engage in two serious enterprises certainly
had the effect of postponing the partition of Turkey. Delay was all in
his favour, if he was to gain the lion's share of the spoils. Russian
troops were ready on the banks of the Danube; but he was not as yet
fully prepared. His hold on Dalmatia, Ragusa, and Corfu was not wholly
assured. Sicily and Malta still defied him; and not until he seized
Sicily could he gain the control of the Mediterranean--"the constant
aim of my policy." Only when that great sea had become a French lake
could he hope to plant himself firmly in Albania, Thessaly, Greece,
Crete, Egypt, and Syria.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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