is denied by Niccolo, who asserts, that the dominions of monarchs and republics have constantly been extended by power, which is so incompatible with law, that the powerful and mighty universally despise all legal obligations, which are binding only on the poor and humble. In the third part of the _Historia disceptativa convivialis_ Poggio discusses the question, whether the Latin language was universally spoken by the Romans, or whether the learned made use of a language different from that of the vulgar. Poggio maintains, in opposition to the opinion of his deceased friend, Leonardo Aretino,[414] and others, that the language used by the well-educated Romans was the vernacular language of their country, and that it differed from that of the lower classes in no other respect, than as the language of the well-educated in every country is more elegant and polished than that of the inferior orders of the community. In defence of his opinion, he quotes a considerable number of curious passages from the Roman historians and rhetoricians, which clearly prove his point, and evince his profound acquaintance with Latin literature. The discussion of the comparative dignity of the professions of medicine and civil law naturally led to satirical remarks on the part of the respective interlocutors, on the abuse of those two branches of science; and the perusal of this dialogue will serve to shew that its author was fully competent to expose the pompous ignorances of empirics, and to display the detriment which arises to society from those most mischievous of knaves, the unprincipled practitioners of the law. It must also be allowed, that the enumeration which Benedetto Aretino and Niccolo di Foglini set forth of the merits of their respective professions, forcibly inculcates the benefits which accrue to mankind from the study of medicine and of jurisprudence, and the true principles upon which those studies ought to be conducted.[415] The following letter, which Poggio addressed to his friend Benedetto, in the year 1436, demonstrates, that the result of his serious meditations had convinced him that legal practice was not only compatible with moral rectitude, but was most likely to be productive of gain when regulated by the dictates of integrity.