The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human ProgressSantayana, George
Philosophy
The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress
Santayana, George
Philosophy
revival in memory of similar sensations temporally distinct.
Thus the many armed with prejudice and the few armed with logic fight an
eternal battle, the logician charging the physical world with
unintelligibility and the man of common-sense charging the logical
world with abstractness and unreality. The former view is the more
profound, since association by similarity is the more elementary and
gives constancy to meanings; while the latter view is the more
practical, since association by contiguity alone informs the mind about
the mechanical sequence of its own experience. Neither principle can be
dispensed with, and each errs only in denouncing the other and wishing
to be omnivorous, as if on the one hand logic could make anybody
understand the history of events and the conjunction of objects, or on
the other hand as if cognitive and moral processes could have any other
terms than constant and ideal natures. The namable essence of things or
the standard of values must always be an ideal figment; existence must
always be an empirical fact. The former remains always remote from
natural existence and the latter irreducible to a logical principle.[C]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote A: This distinction, in one sense, is Platonic: but Plato’s
Reason was distinguished from understanding (which dealt with phenomenal
experience) because it was a moral faculty defining those values and
meanings which in Platonic nomenclature took the title of reality. The
German Reason was only imagination, substituting a dialectical or poetic
history of the world for its natural development. German idealism,
accordingly, was not, like Plato’s, a moral philosophy hypostasised but
a false physics adored.]
[Footnote B: This natural order and affinity is something imputed to the
ultimate object of thought—the reality—by the last act of judgment
assuming its own truth. It is, of course, not observable by
consciousness before the first experiment in comprehension has been
made; the act of comprehension which first imposes on the sensuous
material some subjective category is the first to arrive at the notion
of an objective order. The historian, however, has a well-tried and
mature conception of the natural order arrived at after many such
experiments in comprehension. From the vantage-ground of this latest
hypothesis, he surveys the attempts others have made to understand
events and compares them with the objective order which he believes
himself to have discovered. This observation is made here lest the
reader should confuse the natural order, imagined to exist before any
application of human categories, with the last conception of that order
attained by the philosopher. The latter is but faith, the former is
faith’s ideal object.]
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