The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human ProgressSantayana, George
Philosophy
The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress
Santayana, George
Philosophy
“This world” we call it, not without justifiable pathos, for many other
worlds are conceivable and if discovered might prove more rational and
intelligible and more akin to the soul than this strange universe which
man has hitherto always looked upon with increasing astonishment. The
materials of experience are no sooner in hand than they are transformed
by intelligence, reduced to those permanent presences, those natures and
relations, which alone can live in discourse. Those materials,
rearranged into the abstract summaries we call history or science, or
pieced out into the reconstructions and extensions we call poetry or
religion, furnish us with ideas of as many dream-worlds as we please,
all nearer to reason’s ideal than is the actual chaos of perceptual
experience, and some nearer to the heart’s desire. When an empirical
philosophy, therefore, calls us back from the irresponsible flights of
imagination to the shock of sense and tries to remind us that in this
alone we touch existence and come upon fact, we feel dispossessed of our
nature and cramped in our life. The actuality possessed by external
experience cannot make up for its instability, nor the applicability of
scientific principles for their hypothetical character. The dependence
upon sense, which we are reduced to when we consider the world of
existences, becomes a too plain hint of our essential impotence and
mortality, while the play of logical fancy, though it remain inevitable,
is saddened by a consciousness of its own insignificance.
[Sidenote: Her inexperience.]
That dignity, then, which inheres in logical ideas and their affinity to
moral enthusiasm, springs from their congruity with the primary habits
of intelligence and idealisation. The soul or self or personality, which
in sophisticated social life is so much the centre of passion and
concern, is itself an idea, a concretion in discourse; and the level on
which it swims comes to be, by association and affinity, the region of
all the more vivid and massive human interests. The pleasures which lie
beneath it are ignored, and the ideals which lie above it are not
perceived. Aversion to an empirical or naturalistic philosophy
accordingly expresses a sort of logical patriotism and attachment to
homespun ideas. The actual is too remote and unfriendly to the dreamer;
to understand it he has to learn a foreign tongue, which his native
prejudice imagines to be unmeaning and unpoetical. The truth is,
however, that nature’s language is too rich for man; and the discomfort
he feels when he is compelled to use it merely marks his lack of
education. There is nothing cheaper than idealism. It can be had by
merely not observing the ineptitude of our chance prejudices, and by
declaring that the first rhymes that have struck our ear are the eternal
and necessary harmonies of the world.
[Sidenote: Platonism spontaneous.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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