The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human ProgressSantayana, George
Philosophy
The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress
Santayana, George
Philosophy
Conversely, what in such a transcendental sense is causeless and free
will evidently not be causal or determinant, being something altogether
universal and notional, without inherent determinations or specific
affinities. The objects figuring in consciousness will have implications
and will require causes; not so the consciousness itself. The Ego to
which all things appear equally, whatever their form or history, is the
ground of nothing incidental: no specific characters or order found in
the world can be attributed to its efficacy. The march of experience is
not determined by the mere fact that experience exists. Another
experience, differently logical, might be equally real. Consciousness is
not itself dynamic, for it has no body, no idiosyncrasy or particular
locus, to be the point of origin for definite relationships. It is
merely an abstract name for the actuality of its random objects. All
force, implication, or direction inhere in the constitution of specific
objects and live in their interplay. Logic is revealed to thought no
less than nature is, and even what we call invention or fancy is
generated not by thought itself but by the chance fertility of nebulous
objects, floating and breeding in the primeval chaos. Where the natural
order lapses, if it ever does, not mind or will or reason can possibly
intervene to fill the chasm—for these are parcels and expressions of
the natural order—but only nothingness and pure chance.
[Sidenote: and transcendent.]
Thought is thus an expression of natural relations, as will is of
natural affinities; yet consciousness of an object’s value, while it
declares the blind disposition to pursue that object, constitutes its
entire worth. Apart from the pains and satisfactions involved, an
impulse and its execution would be alike destitute of importance. It
would matter nothing how chaotic or how orderly the world became, or
what animal bodies arose or perished there; any tendencies afoot in
nature, whatever they might construct or dissolve, would involve no
progress or disaster, since no preferences would exist to pronounce one
eventual state of things better than another. These preferences are in
themselves, if the dynamic order alone be considered, works of
supererogation, expressing force but not producing it, like a statue of
Hercules; but the principle of such preferences, the force they express
and depend upon, is some mechanical impulse itself involved in the
causal process. Expression gives value to power, and the strength of
Hercules would have no virtue in it had it contributed nothing to art
and civilisation. That conceived basis of all life which we call matter
would be a mere potentiality, an inferred instrument deprived of its
function, if it did not actually issue in life and consciousness. What
gives the material world a legitimate status and perpetual pertinence in
human discourse is the conscious life it supports and carries in its own
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