The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human ProgressSantayana, George
Philosophy
The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress
Santayana, George
Philosophy
The force for this new trial is but the old impulse renewed; this new
hope is a justified remnant of the old optimism. Each passion, in this
second campaign, takes the field conscious that it has indomitable
enemies and ready to sign a reasonable peace, and even to capitulate
before superior forces. Such tameness may be at first merely a
consequence of exhaustion and prudence; but a mortal will, though
absolute in its deliverances, is very far from constant, and its
sacrifices soon constitute a habit, its exile a new home. The old
ambition, now proved to be unrealisable, begins to seem capricious and
extravagant; the circle of possible satisfactions becomes the field of
conventional happiness. Experience, which brings about this humbler and
more prosaic state of mind, has its own imaginative fruits. Among those
forces which compelled each particular impulse to abate its pretensions,
the most conspicuous were other impulses, other interests active in
oneself and in one’s neighbours. When the power of these alien demands
is recognised they begin, in a physical way, to be respected; when an
adjustment to them is sought they begin to be understood, for it is only
by studying their expression and tendency that the degree of their
hostility can be measured. But to understand is more than to forgive, it
is to adopt; and the passion that thought merely to withdraw into a
sullen and maimed self-indulgence can feel itself expanded by sympathies
which in its primal vehemence it would have excluded altogether.
Experience, in bringing humility, brings intelligence also. Personal
interests begin to seem relative, factors only in a general voluminous
welfare expressed in many common institutions and arts, moulds for
whatever is communicable or rational in every passion. Each original
impulse, when trimmed down more or less according to its degree of
savageness, can then inhabit the state, and every good, when
sufficiently transfigured, can be found again in the general ideal. The
factors may indeed often be unrecognisable in the result, so much does
the process of domestication transform them; but the interests that
animated them survive this discipline and the new purpose is really
esteemed; else the ideal would have no moral force. An ideal
representing no living interest would be irrelevant to practice, just as
a conception of reality would be irrelevant to perception which should
not be composed of the materials that sense supplies, or should not
re-embody actual sensations in an intelligible system.
[Sidenote: The ideal natural.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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