The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human ProgressSantayana, George
Philosophy
The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress
Santayana, George
Philosophy
What he abhorred was the belief that such methods of interpreting
experience were ultimate and truly valid, and that by thinking after the
fashion of “mathematical atheists” we could understand experience as
well as it can be understood. If the flux of ideas had no other key to
it than that system of associations and algebraic substitutions which is
called the natural world we should indeed know just as well what to
expect in practice and should receive the same education in perception
and reflection; but what difference would there be between such an
idealist and the most pestilential materialist, save his even greater
wariness and scepticism? Berkeley at this time—long before days of
“Siris” and tar-water—was too ignorant and hasty to understand how
inane all spiritual or poetic ideals would be did they not express man’s
tragic dependence on nature and his congruous development in her bosom.
He lived in an age when the study and dominion of external things no
longer served directly spiritual uses. The middle-men had appeared,
those spirits in whom the pursuit of the true and the practical never
leads to possession of the good, but loses itself, like a river in sand,
amid irrational habits and passions. He was accordingly repelled by
whatever philosophy was in him, no less than by his religious
prejudices, from submergence in external interests, and he could see no
better way of vindicating the supremacy of moral goods than to deny the
reality of matter, the finality of science, and the constructive powers
of reason altogether. With honest English empiricism he saw that science
had nothing absolute or sacrosanct about it, and rightly placed the
value of theory in its humane uses; but the complementary truth escaped
him altogether that only the free and contemplative expression of
reason, of which science is a chief part, can render anything else
humane, useful, or practical. He was accordingly a party man in
philosophy, where partisanship is treason, and opposed the work of
reason in the theoretical field, hoping thus to advance it in the moral.
[Sidenote: Puerility in morals.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account