The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human ProgressSantayana, George
Philosophy
The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress
Santayana, George
Philosophy
[Sidenote: Two usual accounts of this conception criticised:]
[Sidenote: analogy between bodies,]
The first suggestion has the advantage that it escapes solipsism by a
reasonable argument, provided the existence of the material world has
already been granted. But if the material world is called back into the
private mind, it is evident that every soul supposed to inhabit it or to
be expressed in it must follow it thither, as inevitably as the
characters and forces in an imagined story must remain with it in the
inventor’s imagination. When, on the contrary, nature is left standing,
it is reasonable to suppose that animals having a similar origin and
similar physical powers should have similar minds, if any of them was to
have a mind at all. The theory, however, is not satisfactory on other
grounds. We do not in reality associate our own grimaces with the
feelings that accompany them and subsequently, on recognising similar
grimaces in another, proceed to attribute emotions to him like those we
formerly experienced. Our own grimaces are not easily perceived, and
other men’s actions often reveal passions which we have never had, at
least with anything like their suggested colouring and intensity. This
first view is strangely artificial and mistakes for the natural origin
of the belief in question what may be perhaps its ultimate test.
[Sidenote: and dramatic dialogue in the soul.]
The second suggestion, on the other in hand, takes us into a mystic
region. That we evoke the felt souls of our fellows by dramatic
imagination is doubtless true; but this does not explain how we come to
do so, under what stimulus and in what circumstances. Nor does it avoid
solipsism; for the felt counterparts of my own will are echoes within
me, while if other minds actually exist they cannot have for their
essence to play a game with me in my own fancy. Such society would be
mythical, and while the sense for society may well be mythical in its
origin, it must acquire some other character if it is to have practical
and moral validity. But practical and moral validity is above all what
society seems to have. This second theory, therefore, while its feeling
for psychological reality is keener, does not make the recognition of
other minds intelligible and leaves our faith in them without
justification.
[Sidenote: Subject and object empirical, not transcendental, terms.]
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