From the composition and character of such governments, it is obvious that neither individuals nor the community can recognise, much less feel an attachment to what we call the state, as separated from the persons who, for the time being, preside over the different branches of its administration. The sovereign has his servants and adherents; his tributaries, chiefs, commanders, and officers have theirs; but the latter owe no fidelity or allegiance, except to their immediate superiors. Each individual of this body has personal privileges, and enjoys protection in certain rights, from established usages, which, affecting all of the class to which he belongs, cannot be violated with impunity: but as there is no regular constitution of government supported by fixed succession to the throne, men derive no benefit from the state, and owe it therefore no duty. From these facts it is evident that nothing can be so erroneous as to judge the conduct of the natives of India, amid the changes and revolutions to which the governments of that country are continually exposed, by those rules which apply to nations which enjoy civil liberty and equal laws. Treachery and ingratitude to their chief or patron are with them the basest of crimes: and obedience and attachment to those who support them, the highest of virtues. According as they fail in, or fulfil, the obligations which the relations of the society in which they live impose, men are deemed infamous or praise-worthy: and to the reciprocal ties by which such bands are held together, the prince and chief are as often indebted for their safety, as their followers for the just reward of their devoted service. The monarch is secure upon his throne no longer than while he can preserve a body of personal adherents. The chief that is threatened by his sovereign looks to his followers for support or revenge; while the latter, in the lesser vicissitudes to which they are subject, expect with equal confidence the protection of him to whom they give their allegiance. In countries where men are influenced by such motives, the dethronement of a prince is regarded as no more than the fall of a successful leader or chief of a party; and the frequency of such an occurrence has perhaps tended, more than all other causes, to temper the exercise of despotic power, and to compel sovereigns who owned no other check to seek its continuance, by reconciling to their rule those by whom it was so liable to be subverted. The construction of the government of Suraj-u-Dowlah was like that of other Mahommedan states: but the elements of which it was composed wanted the controlling spirit of a superior like Aliverdi Khan. Among the chiefs of the army there were several who early took alarm at the excesses of their young prince, and who, confiding more in their own influence and strength than in his justice or consideration, assumed an attitude of very doubtful allegiance.