"All the efforts of that ambitious prince must prove vain against our numbers, revenues, and discipline. His sepoys, when they come to action, will never stand against ours, headed by English officers; and, if he trusts to his infantry alone, the loss of a battle will be ruin. But if he makes war upon us in Bengal with them, he may distress us for a time, and lessen both our investments and revenues, which is the greatest detriment the nation and Company can suffer. At present, however, I both wish and hope, he has no views to the southward, but that he bends his thoughts towards Delhi, and wishes to have the King with him. So do I too, if the King's consent could be obtained for that purpose. I was always apprehensive the King would endeavour to embark us, by some means or other, in his extensive views of going to Delhi, and reducing to obedience by our means all Hindostan. This is a plan I have always opposed; and, to tell you the truth, I wish our troops were all in Bengal, and that no other object employed our attention, but that of defending ourselves when attacked. I wish the King was gone to Delhi or any where, so as we had nothing more to do with him; or that he could be prevailed upon to spend the rest of his days and money quietly at Patna. I think the wisest scheme we could pursue would be, to take no open part with these Hindostan princes, but privately promote their quarrelling to all eternity." His letter to General Joseph Smith on the war in the Carnatic, is too creditable to that gallant officer to be omitted. "Berkeley Square, 9th March, 1770. "Dear Sir, "I have received, and am much obliged to you for your accurate and circumstantial letter of the 15th of June, 1769.[165] Our misfortunes, and I may add, our mismanagements on the coast, have been great indeed: but it is some satisfaction to me to find, that your conduct has been such as all who know you had reason to expect; and that, whoever may have been to blame, no impeachment can be laid against you. I need not enter into reflections upon the fundamental errors of the war. For the honour of the nation and the Company, I wish they could be for ever buried in oblivion, or at least remembered only by ourselves, to warn us upon any future occasion. The measure of sending field-deputies has justly been condemned by every body. Gentlemen in the civil service may be very properly employed out of the presidency in the collection of the revenues; but nothing can be more absurd and pernicious than sending them to a camp, where they can only embarrass or obstruct plans and operations which they do not understand. I sincerely wish that the peace, however ingloriously made, may continue: but this is merely a wish, and by no means my expectation. I am with great regard, &c."