[99] This observation was suggested by an examination of a late judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, in the case of Jones _v._ Bright and others, on showing cause against rule for a new trial. This was an action brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendants for selling him copper, for the purpose of sheathing the ship Isabella, which, from the rapidity of its corrosion, was inferred to have an inherent defect in its composition. In this case it was held, that with respect to _warranty_, there is a very wide difference as it applies to articles which are not the subject of manufacture, and those which are the produce of manufacture and of human industry. In the one case, it may be that no prudence, no care, could have guarded against a secret defect; in the other, by using due care, and providing proper materials, any defect in the manufacture may be guarded against. "In the case of the bowsprit, the man did not make the timber which composed the bowsprit; he merely cut it out, and fitted it to meet the purpose, and could therefore by no means have guarded against the rottenness in the centre of that bowsprit: but if a man makes copper, he may guard against inherent defects in that copper, by taking care that the copper contains a proper proportion of pure copper; and also by taking care that it is so well manufactured, that it does not drink in a greater quantity of oxygen than ought to be admitted into it, and that that oxygen, which of necessity gets in, (for some will,) shall be so distributed, that it shall not operate, as in the opinion of an intelligent witness the oxygen in this case did operate, by forming itself in patches, and thereby rendering it soft, and rendering the copper incapable of resisting the influence of salt-water--that he can guard against." With all due deference to the learned Judge, suppose it be shown that no human wisdom can guard against those circumstances by which a portion of the copper surface may be rendered more highly electro-positive, what becomes of the judgment? That the decay of copper sheathing is effected by extrinsic causes, and does not necessarily depend upon an inherent defect in the metal, may be proved in numerous ways. If it were owing to the quality of the copper, why should five, ten, or twenty sheets out of a hundred, made from the same charge of metal in a furnace and manufactured under precisely similar circumstances, be affected, and the remainder be perfectly sound? Why, again, should sheets, made from several distinct charges, placed on a particular vessel, be acted upon, while the same copper on other bottoms is not more than usually dissolved? Did any inherent defect exist in the metal, it surely must have equally affected the whole batch.