'On Wednesday, June 30th, at three o'clock, an interview took place between Lord Granville, Lord Northbrook' (First Lord of the Admiralty), 'Childers' (Secretary of State for War), 'Sir John Adye' (Childers' adviser), 'and myself at the Foreign Office as to the means of coercing Turkey. The War Office wished to place an army corps in Greece, which, if they were to send a full complement of guns, would take a month. I suggested the far cheaper plan of a naval occupation of the port of Smyrna, and the collection and stoppage of customs and dues. Mr. Gladstone came in a little late, and took up my idea. But, preferring his Montenegrins to my Greeks, he insisted that we should first deal by the fleet with the Montenegrin question at Dulcigno. Both ideas went forward. The Dulcigno demonstration took place, and produced the cession of territory to the Montenegrins; and we afterwards let out to the Turks our intentions with regard to Smyrna, and produced by this means the cession of territory to Greece. [Footnote: _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 231.] 'On Thursday, July 1st, we had a further interview with the Admiralty to arrange our naval demonstrations. On this day there came to see me Professor Panariétoff, a secret agent of the Prince of Bulgaria. He informed me that his Government intended to press on a union between Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. They did not see any reason why they should wait. It might suit the English Liberal Cabinet that they should wait; but from their point of view, why wait? At a party in the evening I met Borthwick, who playfully assured me that he knew that our policy was to send one army corps to Greece to support the Greeks against the Turks, and another to Eastern Roumelia to support the Turks in maintaining the Treaty of Berlin. The two, after each of them had accomplished its mission, would probably, he thought, come into hostilities with one another in Macedonia.' On July 5th the Austrian Ambassador, Count Karolyi, told Sir Charles that the Turkish representative at Vienna had been solemnly warned to reckon no longer upon the possibility of disagreement among the Powers, and to consider 'the danger which would result if the Powers became convinced that the Porte had no respect either for their pledges or its own.' This Dilke hailed as 'a great step in advance on Austria's part,' and on July 7th he called at the Austrian Embassy, at the wish of the Ambassador, who explained the views of his Government: