Pauncefote and Ambassador at Washington.] had suggested in 1884, of attempting to bring all outstanding questions with France into one great settlement, fell still-born, to be vivified, but twenty years later, by Lord Lansdowne in more favourable circumstances. In all possible complications Sir Charles relied much on Italy's close friendship for England--notwithstanding her entry into the Triple Alliance--a friendship due to permanent gratitude for the support which she had received from Lord Russell, Mr. Gladstone, and Lord Palmerston, at the crisis of her fate in 1859; and also to the offer to her of a joint occupation of Egypt in 1882--an offer rejected indeed, but fruitful of good feeling. But more important even than any question of alliances was, he insisted, the necessity that Great Britain should know her own mind, and have a definite policy in regard to the future of Constantinople and of Egypt, and in regard to the Belgian guarantee. Army organization itself obviously depended on policy, and in this connection there was a danger at home greater, perhaps, than any originating abroad. 'It is too much the case with us in England,' he wrote, 'that when we are occupied with the consideration of the Irish problem, or dealing with the circumstances which most often lead to the rise and fall of Ministries, we allow the foreign affairs of the country to be transacted in the dark: with an absence of control which, owing to the efficiency of our Foreign Office, may produce no ill, but also with an absence of knowledge which cannot be advantageous. On the other hand, when some awkward circumstance arises, a disproportionate weight is attached to it by those who have wilfully remained in ignorance of the true position, and the diplomacy of the country is suddenly unduly hampered by criticism which rests on no foundation of fact.'