Whatever opinion may be formed of the man from his varied fortunes, there will be few who will deny that he possessed great mental qualities; some will be found, no doubt, to question his action in deposing Buzurg Khan, and with more justice may his earlier life be blamed for his repeated desertion of his friend and patron Khudayar. Others will call to mind his vacillating conduct in 1875, and deny that he possessed that decision of character which is the salient feature in all truly great men. His unnecessary wars with the Tungani, and the short-sighted policy he pursued of extending his empire up to the vicinity of China, were also calculated to lower his claims to be considered a general or a statesman. In extenuation of these acts, which decidedly undermined the fabric of his rule, it may be mentioned that there is one side of Yakoob Beg's character that has never received sufficient attention. It is what was the secret to his foreign policy. He certainly did not aspire, as many thought, to contest unaided the palm of superiority with Russia in Central Asia. He was far too well informed to dream of that. Nor could he expect to be able to extend his power to the south, where both Afghanistan and Cashmere would resent his presence. The only option left to him as a conqueror was to continue aggrandizing himself at the expense of China. We know not what dreams may have entered the mind of the stanch Mussulman in his palace at Kashgar of uniting in one crusade against China all the followers of the Prophet in Central Asia and of emulating the deeds of some of his predecessors who had carried fire and sword into the border provinces of China, and whom even the Great Wall could not withstand. Over these bright imaginings, arising from tales told of the decadence of China, we know not how much Yakoob Beg may have brooded as he saw his power spread eastward through fifteen degrees of longitude, through Aksu to Kucha, Kucha to Korla, Korla to Karashar, and Karashar to Turfan, until from his far outpost at Chightam he could almost see the rich cities of Hamil and Barkul, cities which are the key to Western China and Northern Tibet, and imagine them to be within his grasp. But the policy of Yakoob Beg will not be clearly appreciated, unless we bear in mind that these ambitious longings were held in check by fear of Russia, and by the hostility of the Tungani, who continued to plot even when subdued. His keen spirit must have chafed greatly under the inability to accomplish that which he conceived to be possible, and despite his numerous triumphs he was at heart a disappointed man.