We have now to describe the movements of the Northern Army, which was
under the immediate command of Tso Tsung Tang, and which was operating
in the north of the state, in complete secrecy. That general had under
him, at the most moderate computation, an army of 28,000 men. By some it
was placed at a higher figure; but a St. Petersburg paper, on the
authority of a Russian merchant, who had been to Manas, computed it to
be of that strength. It was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Manas,
and along the northern skirts of the Tian Shan; and also on the
frontier of the Russian dominions in Kuldja. To all appearance this army
was consigned to a part of enforced inactivity, since it was impossible
to enter Kuldja, and thus proceed by their old routes through the passes
of Bedal or Muzart. But it was not so; the travels of Colonel Prjevalsky
in the commencement of 1877 had not been unobserved by the Chinese, and
it was assumed that where a Russian officer with his Cossack following
could go, there also could go a Chinese army. By those little-known
passes, which are made by the Tekes and Great Yuldus rivers, the Chinese
army, under Tso Tsung Tang, crossed over into Kashgaria; and it is
probable that the two armies joined in the neighbourhood of Bai. It was
by this stroke of strategy on the part of Tso Tsung Tang that the
Chinese found themselves before the walls of Aksu, with an overwhelming
army, at the very sight of which all thought of resistance died away
from the hearts of the Mussulman peoples and garrisons. Tso Tsung Tang
appeared before the walls of Aksu, the bulwark of Kashgar on the east,
and its commandant, panic stricken, abandoned his post at the first
onset. He was subsequently taken prisoner by an officer of Kuli Beg, and
executed. The Chinese then advanced on Ush Turfan, which also
surrendered without a blow. As we said, the Chinese have not published
any detailed description of this portion of the war, and we are
consequently unable to say what their version is of those reported
atrocities at Aksu and Ush Turfan, of which the Russian papers have made
so much. There is no doubt that a very large number of refugees fled to
Russian territory, perhaps 10,000 in all, and these brought with them
the tales of fear and exaggerated alarm. We may feel little hesitation
in accepting the assertion as true, that the armed garrisons were
slaughtered without exception; but that the unarmed population and the
women and children shared the same fate we distinctly refuse to credit.
There is every precedent in favour of the assumption that a more
moderate policy was pursued, and there is no valid reason why the
Chinese should have dealt with Aksu and Ush Turfan differently to Kucha
or Turfan. The case of Manas has been greatly insisted upon by the
agitators on this "atrocity" question; but there is the highest
authority for asserting that only armed men were massacred there. This
the Chinese have always done; it is a national custom, and they
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