The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Volume 4Coleridge, Samuel Taylor
Religion
The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Volume 4
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor
Literature -- History and criticism
In an age of colloquial idioms, when to write in a loose slang had
become a mark of loyalty, this is the only L'Estrange vulgarism I have
met with in Leighton.
Ib. Exhortation to the Students, p. 252.
Study to acquire such a philosophy as is not barren and babbling, but
solid and true; not such a one as floats upon the surface of endless
verbal controversies, but one that enters into the nature of things;
for he spoke good sense that said, "The philosophy of the Greeks was a
mere jargon, and noise of words."
If so, then so is all philosophy: for what system is there, the elements
and outlines of which are not to be found in the Greek schools? Here
Leighton followed too incautiously the Fathers.
[Footnote 1: Works of Leighton, 4 vols. 8vo. London 1819. Ed.]
[Footnote 2: 'Statesman's Manual', p. 230. 2nd edit. Friend, III. 3d
edit. Ed.]
* * * * *
NOTES ON SHERLOCK'S VINDICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. [1]
Sect. I. p. 3.
Some new philosophers will tell you that the notion of a spirit or an
immaterial substance is a contradiction; for by substance they
understand nothing but matter, and then an immaterial substance is
immaterial matter, that is, matter and no matter, which is a
contradiction; but yet this does not prove an immaterial substance to
be a contradiction, unless they could first prove that there is no
substance but matter; and that they cannot conceive any other
substance but matter, does not prove that there is no other.
Certainly not: but if not only they, but Dr. Sherlock himself and all
mankind, are incapable of attaching any sense to the term substance, but
that of matter,--then for us it would be a contradiction, or a
groundless assertion. Thus: By 'substance' I do not mean the only notion
we can attach to the word; but a somewhat, I know not what, may, for
aught I know, not be contradictory to spirit! Why should we use the
equivocal word, 'substance' (after all but an 'ens logicum'), instead of
the definite term 'self-subsistent?' We are equally conscious of mind,
and of that which we call 'body;' and the only possible philosophical
questions are these three:
1. Are they co-ordinate as agent and re-agent;
2. Or is the one subordinate to the other, as effect to cause, and which
is the cause or ground, which the effect or product;
3. Or are they co-ordinate, but not inter-dependent, that is, 'per
harmonium præstabilitam'.
Ib. p. 4.
Now so far as we understand the nature of any being, we can certainly
tell what is contrary and contradictious to its nature; as that
accidents should subsist without 'their subject', &c.
That accidents should subsist (rather, exist) without a subject, may be
a contradiction, but not that they exist without this or that subject.
The words 'their subject' are 'a petitio principii'.
Ib.
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