Though Christ be God himself, yet if there be three Persons in the Godhead, the equality and sameness of nature does not destroy the subordination of Persons: a Son is equal to his Father by nature, but inferior to him as his Son: if the Father, as I have explained it, be original mind and wisdom, the Son a personal, subsisting, but reflex image of his Father's wisdom, though their eternal wisdom be equal and the same, yet the original is superior to the image, the Father to the Son. But why? We men deem it so, because the image is but a shadow, and not equal to the original; but if it were the same in all perfections, how could that, which is exactly the same, be less? Again, God is all Being:--consequently there can nothing be added to the idea, except what implies a negation or diminution of it. If one and the same Being is equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead, but inferior as man; then it is + 'm-x', which is not = + 'm'. But of two men I may say, that they are equal to each other. A. = + courage-wisdom. B. = + wisdom-courage. Both wise and courageous; but A. inferior in wisdom, B. in courage. But God is all-perfect. Ib. p. 156. So born before all creatures, as [Greek: prôtótokos] also signifies, 'that by him were all things created'. 'All things were created by him, and for him, and he is before all things', (which is the explication of [Greek: pôrtótokos pásaes ktíseos], begotten before the whole creation', and therefore no part of the creation himself.) This is quite right. Our version should here be corrected. [Greek: Prôto] or [Greek: prótaton] is here an intense comparative,--'infinitely before'. Ib. p. 159. That he 'being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God', &c.--Phil. ii. 8, 9. I should be inclined to adopt an interpretation of the unusual phrase [Greek: hárpagmon] somewhat different both from the Socinian and the Church version:--"who being in the form of God did not 'think equality with God a thing to be seized with violence', but made, &c." Ib. p. 160. Is a mere creature a fit lieutenant or representative of God in personal or prerogative acts of government and power? Must not every being be represented by one of his own kind, a man by a man, an angel by an angel, in such acts as are proper to their natures? and must not God then be represented by one who is God? Is any creature capable of the government of the world? Does not this require infinite wisdom and infinite power? And can God communicate infinite wisdom and infinite power to a creature or a finite nature? That is, can a creature be made a true and essential God? This is sound reasoning. It is to be regretted that Sherlock had not confined himself to logical comments on the Scripture, instead of attempting metaphysical solutions. Ib. pp. 161-3.