An admirable antidote for such as, too sober and sincere to pass off feverous sensations for spiritualities, have been perplexed by Wesley's assertions--that a certainty of having been elected is an indispensable mark of election. Whitfield's ultra-Calvinism is Gospel gentleness and Pauline sobriety compared with Wesley's Arminianism in the outset of his career. But the main and most noticeable difference between Leighton and the modern Methodists is to be found in the uniform selfishness of the latter. Not "Do you wish to love God?" "Do you love your neighbour?" "Do you think, 'O how dear and lovely must Christ be!'"--but--"Are you certain that Christ has saved 'you'; that he died for 'you--you--you --yourself'?" on to the end of the chapter. This is Wesley's doctrine. Lecture IX. vol. IV. p. 96. For that this was his fixed purpose, Lucretius not only vows, but also boasts of it, and loads him (Epicurus) with ill-advised praises, for endeavouring through the whole course of his philosophy to free the minds of men from all the bonds and ties of religion. But surely in this passage 'religio' must be rendered superstition, the most effectual means for the removal of which Epicurus supposed himself to have found in the exclusion of the 'gods many and lords many', from their imagined agency in all the 'phænomena' of nature and the events of history, substituting for these the belief in fixed laws, having in themselves their evidence and necessity. On this account, in this passage at least, Lucretius praises his master. Ib. p. 105. They always seemed to me to act a very ridiculous part, who contend, that the effect of the divine decree is absolutely irreconcilable with human liberty; because the natural and necessary liberty of a rational creature is to act or choose from a rational motive, or spontaneously, and of purpose: but who sees not, that, on the supposition of the most absolute decree, this liberty is not taken away, but rather established and confirmed? For the decree is, 'that such an one shall make choice of, or do some particular thing freely. And whoever pretends to deny, that whatever is done or chosen, whether good or indifferent, is so done or chosen, or, at least, may be so, espouses an absurdity.' I fear, I fear, that this is a sophism not worthy of Archbishop Leighton. It seems to me tantamount to saying--"I force that man to do so or so without my forcing him." But however that may be, the following sentences are more precious than diamonds. They are divine. Ib. Lect. XI. p. 113.