The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
The class of which the first example is a simple instance
has been already abundantly discussed. The interpretation
of it is as follows: If balls be continually drawn and replaced,
the proportion of white ones to the whole number
drawn will tend towards the fraction 1/10. The contemplated
action is a single one, but we view it as one of the above
series; at least our opinion is formed upon that assumption.
We conclude that we are going to take one of a series of
events which may appear individually fortuitous, but in
which, in the long run, those of a given kind are one-tenth of
the whole; this kind (white) is then singled out by anticipation.
By stating that its chance is 1/10, we merely mean to
assert this physical fact, together with such other mental
facts, emotions, inferences, &c., as may be properly associated
with it.
11. Have we to interpret the second example in a
different way? Here also we have a single instance, but the
nature of the question would seem to decide that the only
series to which it can properly be referred is the following:--Balls
are continually drawn from _different_ bags each containing
ten, and are always found to be white; what is ultimately
the proportion of cases in which they will be found to have
been taken from bags with only one white ball in them?
Now it may be readily shown[5] that time has nothing to
do with the question; omitting therefore the consideration
of this element, we have for the two series from which our
opinions in these two examples respectively are to be
formed:--(1) balls of different colours presented to us in a
given ultimate ratio; (2) bags with different contents similarly
presented. From these data respectively we have to
assign their due weight to our anticipations of (1) a white
ball; (2) a bag containing but one white ball. So stated the
problems would appear to be formally identical.
When, however, we begin the practical work of solving
them we perceive a most important distinction. In the first
example there is not much that is arbitrary; balls would
under such circumstance really come out more or less accurately
in the proportion expected. Moreover, in case it
should be objected that it is difficult to prove that they will
do so, it does not seem an unfair demand to say that the balls
are to be 'well-mixed' or 'fairly distributed,' or to introduce
any of the other conditions by which, under the semblance of
judging _à priori_, we take care to secure our prospect of a
series of the desired kind. But we cannot say the same in
the case of the second example.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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