15. When, however, we take what may be called, by comparison with the above purely artificial examples, instances presented by nature, much of this uncertainty will disappear, and then all real distinction between direct and inverse probability will often vanish. In such cases the causes are mostly determined by tolerably definite rules, instead of being a mere cloud-land of capricious guesses. We may either find their relative frequency of occurrence by reference to tables, or may be able to infer it by examination of the circumstances under which they are brought about. Almost any simple example would then serve to illustrate the fact that under such circumstances the distinction between direct and inverse probability disappears altogether, or merely resolves itself into one of _time_, which, as will be more fully shown in a future chapter, is entirely foreign to our subject. It is not of course intended to imply that difficulties similar to those mentioned above do not occasionally invade us here also. As already mentioned, they are, if not inherent in the subject, at any rate almost unavoidable in comparison with the simpler and more direct procedure of determining what is likely to follow from assigned conditions. What is meant is that so long as we confine ourselves within the comparatively regular and uniform field of natural sequences and co-existences, statistics of causes may be just as readily available as those of effects. There will not be much more that is arbitrary in the one than in the other. But of course this security is lost when, as will be almost immediately noticed, what may be called metaphysical rather than natural causes are introduced into the enquiry. For instance, it is known that in London about 20 people die per thousand each year. Suppose it also known that of every 100 deaths there are about 4 attributable to bronchitis. The odds therefore against any unknown person dying of bronchitis in a given year are 1249 to 1. Exactly the same statistics are available to solve the inverse problem:--A man is dead, what is the chance that he died of bronchitis? Here, since the man's death is taken for granted, we do not require to know the general average mortality. All that we want is the proportional mortality from the disease in question as given above. If Probability dealt only with inferences founded in this way upon actual statistics, and these tolerably extensive, it is scarcely likely that any distinction such as this between direct and inverse problems would ever have been drawn.