The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
(1) In the first place we may take it for what it professes
to be, and for what it is commonly understood to
be, viz. a rule which assigns the measure of expectation
we ought to entertain of the recurrence of the event under
the circumstances in question. Of course, on the view
adopted in this work, we insist on enquiring whether it is
really true that on the average events do thus repeat their
performance in accordance with this law. Thus tested, no
one surely would attempt to defend such a formula. So
far from past occurrence being a ground for belief in future
recurrence, there are (as will be more fully pointed out
in the Chapter on Fallacies) plenty of cases in which the
direct contrary holds good. Then again a rule of this kind
is subject to the very serious perplexity to be explained
in our next chapter, arising out of the necessary arbitrariness
of such inverse reference. That is, when an event has
happened but a few times, we have no certain guide; and
when it has happened but once,[2] we have no guide whatever,
as to the class of cases to which it is to be referred. In
the example above, about the flags, why did we stop short at
this notion simply, instead of specifying the size, shape, &c.
of the flags?
De Morgan, it must be remembered, only accepts this rule
in a qualified sense. He regards it as furnishing a
_minimum_ value for the amount of our expectation. He
terms it "the rule of probability of a _pure induction_," and
says of it, "The probabilities shown by the above rules
are merely _minima_ which may be augmented by other
sources of knowledge." That is, he recognizes only those
instances in which our belief in the Uniformity of Nature
and in the existence of special laws of causation comes in
to supplement that which arises from the mere frequency
of past occurrence. This however does not meet those cases
in which past occurrence is a positive ground of disbelief in
future recurrence.
9. (2) There is however another and very different
view which might be taken of such a rule. It is one, an
obscure recognition of which has very likely had much to
do with the acceptance which the rule has received.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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