The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
It is difficult to render such an argument precise without
rendering it simply ridiculous. Strictly understood it can
surely bear only one of two interpretations. On the one
hand we may be personifying Chance: regarding it as an
agent which must be reckoned with as being quite capable
of having produced man, or at any rate having arranged the
proportion of the sexes. And then the decision must be
drawn, as between this agent and the Creator, which of the
two produced the existent arrangement. If so, and Chance
be defined as any agent which produces a chance or random
arrangement, I am afraid there can be little doubt that it
was this agent that was at work in the case in question.
The arrangement of male and female births presents, so far
as we can see, one of the most perfect examples of chance:
there is ultimate uniformity emerging out of individual
irregularity: all the 'runs' or successions of each alternative
are duly represented: the fact of, say, five sons having been
already born in a family does not seem to have any certain
effect in diminishing the likelihood of the next being a son,
and so on. Such a nearly perfect instance of 'independent
events' is comparatively very rare in physical phenomena.
It is all that we can claim from a chance arrangement.[9] The
only other interpretation I can see is to suggest that there
was but one agent who might, like any one of us, have either
tossed up or designed, and we have to ascertain which course
he probably adopted in the case in question. Here too, if
we are to judge of his mode of action by the tests we should
apply to any work of our own, it would certainly look very
much as if he had adopted some scheme of tossing.
21. The simple fact is that any rational attempt to
decide between chance and design as agencies must be confined
to the case of finite intelligences. One of the important
determining elements here, as we have seen, is the
state of knowledge of the agent, and the conventional estimate
entertained about this or that particular arrangement;
and these can be appreciated only when we are dealing with
beings like ourselves.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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