The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
13. In connection with the subject at present under
discussion we will now take notice of a distinction which we
shall often find insisted on in works on Probability, but to
which apparently needless importance has been attached.
It is frequently said that probability is _relative_, in the sense
that it has a different value to different persons according
to their respective information upon the subject in question.
For example, two persons, A and B, are going to draw
a ball from a bag containing 4 balls: A knows that the
balls are black and white, but does not know more;
B knows that three are black and one white. It would
be said that the probability of a white ball to A is 1/2, and
to B 1/4.
When however we regard the subject from the material
standing point, there really does not seem to me much more
in this than the principle, equally true in every other science,
that our inferences will vary according to the data we assume.
We might on logical grounds with almost equal
propriety speak of the area of a field or the height of a
mountain being relative, and therefore having one value to
one person and another to another. The real meaning of the
example cited above is this: A supposes that he is choosing
white at random out of a series which in the long run would
give white and black equally often; B supposes that he
is choosing white out of a series which in the long run would
give three black to one white. By the application, therefore,
of a precisely similar rule they draw different conclusions;
but so they would under the same circumstances in
any other science. If two men are measuring the height of
a mountain, and one supposes his base to be 1000 feet,
whilst the other takes it to be 1001, they would of course
form different opinions about the height. The science of
mensuration is not supposed to have anything to do with
the truth of the data, but assumes them to have been correctly
taken; why should not this be equally the case with
Probability, making of course due allowance for the peculiar
character of the data with which it is concerned?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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