The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
It is quite true that in such examples as the above, especially
the former one, nobody would ever think of appealing
to statistics. This would be a tedious process to adopt when,
as here, the mechanical and other conditions upon which the
production of the events depend are comparatively few, determinate,
and admit of isolated consideration, whilst the
enormous number of combinations which can be constructed
out of them causes an enormous consequent multiplicity of
ways in which the events can possibly happen. Hence, in
practice, _à priori_ determination is often easy, whilst _à posteriori_
appeal to experience would be not merely tedious but
utterly impracticable. This, combined with the frequent
simplicity and attractiveness of such examples when deductively
treated, has made them very popular, and produced the
impression in many quarters that they are the proper typical
instances to illustrate the theory of chance. Whereas, had
the science been concerned with those kinds of events only
which in practice are commonly made subjects of insurance,
probably no other view would ever have been taken than
that it was based upon direct appeal to experience.
3. When, however, we look a little closer, we find that
there is no occasion for such a sharp distinction as that apparently
implied between the two classes of examples just
indicated. In such cases as those of dice and cards, even, in
which we appear to reason directly from the determining
conditions, or possible variety of the events, rather than from
actual observation of their occurrence, we shall find that this
procedure is only valid by the help of a tacit assumption
which can never be determined otherwise than by direct
experience. It is, no doubt, an exceedingly natural and
obvious assumption, and one which is continually deriving
fresh weight from every-day observation, but it is one which
ought not to be admitted without consideration. As this is a
very important matter, not so much in itself as in connection
with the light which it throws upon the theory of the subject,
we will enter into a somewhat detailed examination of it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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