The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
4. When we have got as far as this it can readily be
shown that an appeal to experience cannot be long evaded.
For _can_ the assertion in question (viz. that the throws of the
penny will occur equally often) be safely made _à priori_?
Those who consider that it can seem hardly to have fully
faced the difficulties which meet them. For when we begin
to enquire seriously whether the penny will really do what
is expected of it, we find that restrictions have to be introduced.
In the first place it must be an ideal coin, with
its sides equal and fair. This restriction is perfectly intelligible;
the study of solid geometry enables us to idealize a
penny into a circular or cylindrical lamina. But this condition
by itself is not sufficient, others are wanted as well. The
penny was supposed to be tossed up, as we say 'at random.'
What is meant by this, and how is this process to be idealized?
To ask this is to introduce no idle subtlety; for it
would scarcely be maintained that the heads and tails would
get their fair chances if, immediately before the throwing,
we were so to place the coin in our hands as to start it
always with the same side upwards. The difference that
would result in consequence, slight as its cause is, would
tend in time to show itself in the results. Or, if we persisted
in starting with each of the two sides alternately
upwards, would the longer repetitions of the same side get
their fair chance?
Perhaps it will be replied that if we think nothing whatever
about these matters all will come right of its own accord.
It may, and doubtless will be so, but this is falling back upon
experience. It is here, then, that we find ourselves resting on
the experimental assumption above mentioned, and which
indeed cannot be avoided. For suppose, lastly, that the
circumstances of nature, or my bodily or mental constitution,
were such that the same side always _is_ started upwards, or
indeed that they are started in any arbitrary order of our
own? Well, it will be replied, it would not then be a fair
trial. If we press in this way for an answer to such enquiries,
we shall find that these tacit restrictions are really nothing
else than a mode of securing an experimental result. They
are only another way of saying, Let a series of actions be
performed in such a way as to secure a sequence of a particular
kind, viz., of the kind described in the previous chapters.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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