The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
Or on the other hand, we may consider that we are treating
of the behaviour of _things_;--balls, dice, births, deaths, &c.;
and drawing inferences about them. But, then, what
were in the former instance allowable assumptions, become
here propositions to be tested by experience. Now the whole
theory of Probability as a practical science, in fact as anything
more than an algebraical truth, depends of course upon
there being a close correspondence between these two views
of the subject, in other words, upon our substituted series
being kept in accordance with the actual series. Experience
abundantly proves that, between considerable limits, in the
example in question, there does exist such a correspondence.
But let no one attempt to enforce our assent to every remote
deduction that mathematicians can draw from their formulæ.
When this is attempted the distinction just traced becomes
prominent and important, and we have to choose our side.
Either we go over to the mathematics, and so lose all right
of discussion about the things; or else we take part with the
things, and so defy the mathematics. We do not question
the formal accuracy of the latter within their own province,
but either we dismiss them as somewhat irrelevant, as applying
to data of whose correctness we cannot be certain, or
we take the liberty of remodelling them so as to bring them
into accordance with facts.
13. A critic of any doctrine can hardly be considered
to have done much more than half his duty when he has
explained and justified his grounds for objecting to it. It
still remains for him to indicate, if only in a few words,
what he considers its legitimate functions and position to be,
for it can seldom happen that he regards it as absolutely
worthless or unmeaning. I should say, then, that when
Probability is thus divorced from direct reference to objects,
as it substantially is by not being founded upon experience,
it simply resolves itself into the common algebraical or arithmetical
doctrine of Permutations and Combinations.[5] The
considerations upon which these depend are purely formal
and necessary, and can be fully reasoned out without any
appeal to experience. We there start from pure considerations
of number or magnitude, and we terminate with them,
having only arithmetical calculations to connect them together.
I wish, for instance, to find the chance of throwing
heads three times running with a penny. All I have to do
is first to ascertain the possible number of throws. Permutations
tell me that with two things thus in question (viz.
head and tail) and three times to perform the process, there
are eight possible forms of the result. Of these eight one
only being favourable, the chance in question is pronounced
to be one-eighth.
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