The ordinary classification of notions, as _clear, distinct_ and _adequate,_ is no part of the notion; it belongs to psychology. Notions, in fact, are here synonymous with mental representations; a _clear_ notion is an abstract simple representation: a _distinct_ notion is one where, in addition to the simplicity, there is one 'mark' or character emphasised as a sign for subjective cognition. There is no more striking mark of the formalism and decay of Logic than the favourite category of the 'mark.' The _adequate_ notion comes nearer the notion proper, or even the Idea: but after all it expresses only the formal circumstance that a notion or representation agrees with its object, that is, with an external thing.--The division into what are called _subordinate_ and _co-ordinate_ notions implies a mechanical distinction of universal from particular which allows only a mere correlation of them in external comparison. Again, an enumeration of such kinds as _contrary_ and _contradictory, affirmative_ and _negative_ notions, &c, is only a chance-directed gleaning of logical forms which properly belong to the sphere of Being or Essence, (where they have been already examined,) and which have nothing to do with the specific notional character as such. The true distinctions in the notion, universal, particular, and individual, may be said also to constitute species of it, but only when they are kept severed from each other by external reflection. The immanent differentiating and specifying of the notion come to sight in the judgment: for to judge is to specify the notion. (b) _The Judgment._ 166.] The Judgment is the notion in its particularity, as a connexion which is also a distinguishing of its functions, which are put as independent and yet as identical with themselves, not with one another. One's first impression about the Judgment is the independence of the two extremes, the subject and the predicate. The former we take to be a thing or term _per se,_ and the predicate a general term outside the said subject and somewhere in our heads. The next point is for us to bring the latter into combination with the former, and in this way frame a Judgment. The copula 'is' however enunciates the predicate _of_ the subject, and so that external subjective subsumption is again put in abeyance, and the Judgment taken as a determination of the object itself.--The etymological meaning of the Judgment (_Urtheil_) in German goes deeper, as it were declaring the unity of the notion to be primary, and its distinction to be the original partition. And that is what the Judgment really is.