184.] This syllogism is completely contingent (α) in the matter of its
terms. The Middle Term, being an abstract particularity, is nothing
but any quality whatever of the subject: but the subject, being
immediate and thus empirically concrete, has several others, and could
therefore be coupled with exactly as many other universalities as it
possesses single qualities. Similarly a single particularity may have
various characters in itself, so that the same _medius terminus_ would
serve to connect the subject with several different universals.
It is more a caprice of fashion, than a sense of its incorrectness,
which has led to the disuse of ceremonious syllogising. This and the
following section indicate the uselessness of such syllogising for the
ends of truth.
The point of view indicated in the paragraph shows how this style of
syllogism can 'demonstrate' (as the phrase goes) the most diverse
conclusions. All that is requisite is to find a _medius terminus_ from
which the transition can be made to the proposition sought. Another
_medius terminus_ would enable us to demonstrate something else, and
even the contrary of the last. And the more concrete an object is, the
more aspects it has, which may become such middle terms. To determine
which of these aspects is more essential than another, again, requires
a further syllogism of this kind, which fixing on the single quality
can with equal ease discover in it some aspect or consideration by
which it can make good its claims to be considered necessary and
important.
Little as we usually think on the Syllogism of Understanding in the
daily business of life, it never ceases to play its part there. In
a civil suit, for instance, it is the duty of the advocate to give
due force to the legal titles which make in favour of his client. In
logical language, such a legal title is nothing but a middle term.
Diplomatic transactions afford another illustration of the same, when,
for instance, different powers lay claim to one and the same territory.
In such a case the laws of inheritance, the geographical position of
the country, the descent and the language of its inhabitants, or any
other ground, may be emphasised as a _medius terminus._
185.] (ß) This syllogism, if it is contingent in point of its terms,
is no less contingent in virtue of the form of relation which is
found in it. In the syllogism, according to its notion, truth lies in
connecting two distinct things by a Middle Term in which they are one.
But connexions of the extremes with the Middle Term (the so-called
_premisses,_ the major and the minor premiss) are in the case of this
syllogism much more decidedly _immediate_ connexions. In other words,
they have not a proper Middle Term.
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