Here begins the second stage of the Criticism of Reason--which, as an independent piece of work, is more valuable than the first. The first part, as has been explained above, teaches that the categories originate in the unity of self-consciousness; that any knowledge which is gained by their means has nothing objective in it, and that the very objectivity claimed for them is only subjective. So far as this goes, the Kantian Criticism presents that 'common' type of idealism known as Subjective Idealism. It asks no questions about the meaning or scope of the categories, but simply considers the abstract form of subjectivity and objectivity, and that even in such a partial way, that the former aspect, that of subjectivity, is retained as a final and purely affirmative term of thought. In the second part, however, when Kant examines the _application,_ as it is called, which Reason makes of the categories in order to know its objects, the content of the categories, at least in some points of view, comes in for discussion: or, at any rate, an opportunity presented itself for a discussion of the question. It is worth while to see what decision Kant arrives at on the subject of metaphysic, as this application of the categories to the unconditioned is called. His method of procedure we shall here briefly state and criticise. 47.] (a) The first of the unconditioned entities which Kant examines is the Soul (see above, § 34). 'In my consciousness,' he says, 'I always find that I (1) am the determining subject: (2) am singular, or abstractly simple: (3) am identical, or one and the same, in all the variety of what I am conscious of: (4) distinguish myself as thinking from all the things outside me.' Now the method of the old metaphysic, as Kant correctly states it, consisted in substituting for these statements of experience the corresponding categories or metaphysical terms. Thus arise these four new propositions: _(a)_ the Soul is a substance: _(b)_ it is a simple substance: _(c)_ it is numerically identical at the various periods of existence: _(d)_ it stands in relation to space. Kant discusses this translation, and draws attention to the Paralogism or mistake of confounding one kind of truth with another. He points out that empirical attributes have here been replaced by categories: and shows that we are not entitled to argue from the former to the latter, or to put the latter in place of the former. This criticism obviously but repeats the observation of Hume (§ 39) that the categories as a whole,--ideas of universality and necessity,--are entirely absent from sensation; and that the empirical fact both in form and contents differs from its intellectual formulation. If the purely empirical fact were held to constitute the credentials of the thought, then no doubt it would be indispensable to be able precisely to identify the 'idea' in the 'impression.'